



The United States successfully fought World War II by field-
ing the largest overseas military forces in the history of the world,
supplied and equipped its military allies in Europe, Africa, Asia,
throughout the Pacific and in the Western Hemisphere, underwrote
almost three-fourths of UNRAA, provided interim aid to Europe,
and at the beginning of the Marshall Plan (1948) held gold in
excess of $24 billions. As of March 1, 1968, U.S. gold holdings
had fallen by more than half, or now amount to $10.9 billions.
During this same period the gold holdings of France, Germany, and
Italy increased from .8 billion in 1949 to 11.9 billion by the end
of 1967. (SeeChartI.)
Since the 1944 Breton Woods Conference the United States
has stood foremost among the financial powers of the world in
opposing exchange controls and in championing the international
flow of capital and trade without nationalistic restrictions. The
exchange controls historically employed by the United States have
been strictly for waging war against acknowledged enemies by blocking
and vesting property of enemy taint, as the United States did during
World War II when it imposed freezing controls in 1940 against
Germany and the countries overrun by Nazi Germany ' and again
against North Korea, Communist China, Cuba, and North Vietnam.-
Such exchange controls against transactions with or on behalf of
recognized enemies were appropriately taken under Section 5(b)
of the Trading-With-the-Enemy Act, as amended.'
On January 1, 1968, this historical position of the United
States against exchange controls was radically altered in a sobering
1 E.O. 8389, as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. 95a at pp. 456-59.
2 31 CFR 500.201 and 31 CFR 515.201.
3 12 U.S.C. 95a and 50 War App. 5. Both citations contain the text of
§ 5(b).
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New Year's message to the American people by President Lyndon
B. Johnson, who that day had signed Executive Order 11387
controlling under Section 5(b) of the Trading-With-the-Enemy Act
foreign direct investments by American capital in friendly coun-
tries, infra, pp. 429-436. On the same day the Secretary of Com-
merce, to whom the President had delegated many of his extraordinary
powers under Section 5(b), issued Part 1000 of Title 15 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, entitled Foreign Direct Investment
Regulations (hereinafter called the "FDIR").' Ever since these
controls were made public on the first of January, 1968, it has
become necessary for U.S. business men investing or even trading
abroad to ask their lawyers what they can do under the burgeoning
FDIR which are rapidly imitating the mercantilist controls of the
ancien rdgime of Bourbon France and the cameralist system of 18th
century Prussia.
How has such a reversal in financial policy come to pass?
I. The Origins of the Balance-of-Payments Problem of the United
States
During the past decade the balance of payments of the United
States has become of mounting concern to the Government, to the
world financial community, and to increasing sectors of the Ameri-
can people. U.S. holdings of gold have been declining at such a
precipitous rate-more than $11 billion in 1967-that it has be-
come unfortunately commonplace that many foreigners now daily
question the stability of the dollar as an international medium of
exchange. Forefront in the attack on the dollar has been Gaullist
France, which has consistently over the past few years demanded
the instant conversion of its dollar earnings into gold.8
4 33 F.R. 47-48.
33 F.R. 49-53, as amended Jan. 22, 1968, 33 F.R. (No. 15).
6 Parenthetically, one should note the interesting fact that the Sino-Soviet
countries have little questioned the dollar, which they constantly employ
as the most appropriate standard for measuring international obligations of
trade and assistance among themselves and with other countries in Europe,
Asia, and Africa.
The London Economist noted that "China did not join in the two big gold
rushes last November and December . . . [and] in the recent, post-devaluation
stampede . . China stood aside. . . . All of which could indicate that
Chairman Mao has recently had greater faith in the dollar and the western
currency structure than a lot of other, more nervous people around the
world." (February 24, 1968, p. 75.)
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CHART I
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IMPACT OF FOREIGN BUSINESS INVESTMENTS, FOREIGN AID
8, THE MILITARY ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES , 1946-66
$ BILLIONS
SOURCE: FOREIGN BUSINESS INVESTMENT, 1950-66 TAKEN FROM TABLE-I P 406
ALL OTHER FIGURES FROM U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCESURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS. THE MILITARY FIGURES HAVE BEEN REDUCED BY CASH SALES
OF MILITARY EQUIPTMENT
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The balance-of-payments crisis of the United States is indeed
unique in the annals of international finance. Such a crisis usually
means that a country's production and export trade are not keeping
pace with those of its principal commercial competitors and that
if these conditions continue, its currency and its reserves may be
in danger. The former is obviously not the case of the United
States-production, industrial and agricultural, and export trade
have been constantly rising during the sixties. U.S. prices are
competitive with those of other countries. In fact, during recent
years the prices of many European competitors have been rising
in comparison.' The question remains unanswered: Why must the
United States, functioning at peak economic efficiency, worry over
its balance of payments?
Yet plainly, the United States has experienced a dramatic loss
of gold-reserves are lower than they have been since the thirties
and are less than half of what they were at the beginning of the
Marshall Plan. Technically, the loss of gold has come about by
virtue of (a) the policy of the United States to buy and sell gold
to foreign monetary authorities at $35 an ounce plus the transfer
points, and (b) the increasing tendency of foreign holders of
dollars to convert to gold. These gold losses have occurred even
though gold itself is a wholly unproductive commodity, earning
no income and costing much to move and to hold. How then did
the foreign buyers of our gold get the dollars which they apparently
do not require for more productive purposes?
The Government's Case: Foreign Investments and Tourism
Excessive lending and investment abroad by American banks
and business enterprise 8 and the explosion of American tourism
7 The Treasury's recent study, Maintaining the Strength of the United
States Dollar in a Strong Free World Economy (1968), shows at p. 69 (multi-
lith edition) that the United States "had for five years an unprecedented degree
of stability in the U.S. in industrial prices, while creeping inflation was going
on in the rest of the world. . . . Along with that price stability we had an
unprecedentedly long period of uninterrupted economic growth. . . ." The
Treasury also found that "in the 1960's, U.S. unit labor costs in manufacturing
declined slightly while those of our major European competitors rose signifi-
cantly" (at p. 79). But "in 1966 and probably in 1967, the U.S. competitive
position was eroded by increases in U.S. labor costs" (at p. 80).
8 Thus the Treasury reported, "The favorable trend in the balance on
goods and services from 1960 to 1964 was offset, however, by a strong
tendency for primate capital outflow to increase" (op. cit., n. 7, at p. 69).
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abroad I are the common answers of the U.S. Government. Foreign
monetary critics who decry the spread of American investment
throughout the world agree on the first.
Is there a demonstrable case for this view that a major cause
for the U.S. balance-of-payments crisis is private lending and in-
vestment abroad? Obviously, any bank which lends money abroad
or any business enterprise which makes capital investments abroad
is by definition making a negative contribution to the balance of
payments of the United States-that is, the outflow of loan and
investment funds from the United States to foreign investment adds
that much to the deficit in the balance of payments. But that defi-
nitional answer fails to take into account the inflow of dividends,
interest, royalties, and fees received on private investments abroad.
And that answer overlooks the close relationship of investment abroad
to export trade. It is only a small chapter in the story if we look
at the capital outflow alone. When we add up the investment income
received by the United States from investment abroad, deduct the
investment income paid out to foreigners on their investments in
the United States, and deduct the current capital outflow, we do
not find figures to support a conclusion for reducing United States
investment abroad for balance-of-payments reasons. Table I,
prepared by the U.S. Treasury, shows the net impact of international
investment on the balance of payments. Continued reliance on
restrictions of capital outflow for private investment abroad, which
have invariably been productive of greater future earnings, is a short-
term situation and indeed slays the goose that lays the golden egg.
This is so, even though that is what de Gaulle would like to see,
so long as it is the American goose without any competitive pat9 de
lois gras.
What Chart H Shows: Foreign Aid and Military Operations A broad
Where then does this continuing balance-of-payments deficit
come from? Chart II shows that the operations of the United States
Government, not private investment, are the principal factors pro-
The Treasury's own figures, however, showed as Chart II does, that inflow of
investment income rose along with the capital outflow, with the result of a
net impact of investment on the balance of payments.
1 The Treasury reported that "the travel deficit increased from approximately
$1.2 billion to $1.6 billion" during the period 1960-1966 (op. cit., n. 7, p.
138).
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TABLE I




Book Outflow Remitted Royalties Impact
Value from U.S. to U.S. and fes Yield ($ Billion)
1950 11,788 621 1,294 126 17.7 0.8
1951 12,979 508 1,492 129 20.1 1.1
1952 14,721 852 1,419 130 18.9 0.6
1953 16,253 735 1,442 128 16.2 0.8
1954 17,631 667 1,725 136 15.6 1.2
1955 19,395 823 1,912 158 17.2 1.3
1956 22,505 1,951 2,171 229 18.2 0.4
1957 25,394 2,442 2,249 238 16.9 -
1958 27,409 1,181 2,121 246 12.8 1.2
1959 29,827 1,372 2,228 348 13.1 1.2
1960 31,815 1,674 2,355 403 13.3 1.1
1961 34,667 1,599 2,768 463 13.4 1.6
1962 37,226 1,654 3,044 580 13.9 2.0
1963 40,686 1,976 3,129 660 14.1 1.8
1964 44,384 2,435 3,674 756 14.3 2.0
1965 49,328 3,418 a 3.963 924 14.4 1.5
1966 54,562 3,543 - 4.045 1,045 13.6 2.0
a Includes use ($52 million in 1965 and $445 million in 1966) of proceeds from bond issues
abroad by domestic-based finance subsidiaries of U.S. firms.
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Maintaining the Strength of the United States Dollar in
a Strong Free World Economy (1968), Table 15 (p. 120), Tab D, Table 2.
ducing over several decades the deficit in our balance of payments.
Is the quick answer also the correct answer?
The explanation for this radical change in the American bal-
ance-of-payments position may be found in several serious errors
in financial judgment by economists who were advising the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the foreign-aid administrator,
whatever his title, and the Council of Economic Advisers over the
past several decades on international financial and monetary policies
of the United States. The present predicament is also due in sub-
stantial measure to 1900 changes in the financial methods of handling
foreign military operations. Gone are the days of lend-lease, when
the United States equipped the greatest military forces in foreign
lands without providing currencies to its allies or aiding them in
building up their gold reserves.
Was It a Fatal Error in Judgment to Make Too Many Grants
and Too Little Repayable Loans Under the Foreign Aid Programs?
At the time of the inauguration of the Marshall Plan in 1948,
both the Executive and the Congress were greatly concerned lest
the foreign aid programs build up foreign monetary reserves by the
aid recipients which would adversely affect United States finances
I0See Report of the National Advisory Council of International Financial
and Monetary Problems (hereinafter called NAC) to the 80th Congress,
2nd Session, H. Doc. 737, pp. 19-23.
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and thereby threaten the only stable currency in the post-war world.
The principle of aid in kind (raw materials and equipment), as against
aid in gold or money, had guided United States financial policy
throughout World War II and in the years immediately thereafter.
With the worsening of economic conditions in Europe and through-
out the rest of the world, great pressures operated on the United
States to provide aid for the rebuilding of war-torn economies and
to do so on a grant basis rather than in loans. In the first year of
the Marshall Plan, the Congress, principally at the insistence of
the late Senator Harry Byrd, required that at least one billion dollars
of the annual aid program of $4 billion should be used exclusively
on a loan basis or used in guaranties of private investment. The
U.S. Treasury must today deeply regret that the Marshall Plan
loans were made in that precise amount and no more.1 All the
other aid funds which could have been extended on either a grant
or a loan basis were made available largely on a grant basis.
The reason for this shortsighted decision against loans and
in favor of grants in the European Recovery Program (ERP) was
that the economists administering the program had so little confidence
in the success of their plans for European recovery that they fully
expected European trade and finance to continue indefinitely in a
deficit relationship to the United States. To some economists the
"dollar gap" was a permanent problem. Hence they did not want
to add to the problem of European reconstruction by saddling France,
Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom with debts owing to the
United States.
The aversion of the economists to inter-governmental loans was
a lesson that they thought they learned decisively from World War I
debts and the insoluble transfer problem of the twenties that led to
the collapse of European economies in the thirties, a collapse culmi-
nating in the famous Hoover Moratorium which suspended payment
on World War I debts by most European countries to the United
States.12 The economists contended that the way to avoid the prob-
n1 Loans were actually held to $972 millions. The interest rate was 21/2 %,
with a waiver of all interest for the period until June 30, 1952, the term
was typically 35 years, with no amortization until June 30, 1952, or, in some
cases, June 30, 1956. See Report for NAC for the period April 1, to September
30, 1948, pp.. 18-19.
1 With the exception of Finland, the World War I debts of Europe to
the United States have not been serviced since the Hoover Moratorium which
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lem of debt repayment and negotiations over defaults was not to have
any debts at all. Thus there could be no debts to be suspended or
forgiven. The forgiveness of debts, the economists believed, pre-
sented some constitutional difficulties in the absence of Congressional
authorization. If, however, the Executive could provide aid on a
give-away basis, thus creating no debt, it would be unnecessary later
to go to Congress for authority to suspend or adjust debts. This
reasoning lay behind most of the foreign aid decisions on a grant
basis for the next decade.
The official formulation of the foreign aid loan policy by the
National Advisory Council on International Financial and Monetary
Problems at its inception was as follows:
Loan Policy
Certain European countries have accumulated a substan-
tial indebtedness to the United States, including debts arising
from war account settlements, postwar credits, and loans ex-
tended by ECA during its first year of operations. A further
large mortgage upon future dollar receipts would in all prob-
ability be a deterrent to the objectives of the recovery program.
The imposition of further claims against European dollar earn-
ings by the United States Government would lead to a smaller
margin of flexibility in the international accounts of the debtor
countries, thereby necessitating disproportionate adjustments
in vital imports as earnings fluctuate. The probable effect would
did not cancel but only suspended the payment of the debts. France and others
have declined to resume service bn the debts. The Executive has recently been
loathe to press collection. Efforts are pending in Congress to press for collection.
In view of the long history of nonpayment and the persistent doubts among
Executive agencies as to the collectability of the debts, it is urllikely that a
general exhortation by the Congress to the Executive to press France for pay-
ment of its World War I debts will produce anything. However, if the Congress
were to direct the Executive to submit the issue of France's legal liability
for its World War I debts to the International Court of Justice, the issue
could be finally resolved by an independent tribunal. True, France could
avail itself of the Connolly Reservation by the United States, and claim that
the war debt issue was one of its own domestic jurisdiction, as determined
by France, whereupon the ICJ would lose jurisdiction. But then France,
which prides itself on its logicality, would necessarily abandon the argument
that the war debts were interdependent with German reparations payments,
for no such argument would be available if the issue were exclusively one of
domestic jurisdiction.
The vast increases of the gold reserves of both Germany and France would
appear to destroy the historic argument against payment of World War I
debts and reparations, for such debts to the United States could obviously
be paid without now creating an insoluble "transfer" problem. Both countries
have the gold!
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be to reduce to a corresponding extent the capacity of participat-
ing countries to service additional financing which they may
require and to pay earnings on direct investments. Therefore,
any substantial increases in dollar service charges resulting from
the assumption of increased obligations to the United States
Government would be scrutinized with particular concern by
international lending agencies and private investors.
The Council consequently recommended that the Admin-
istrator for Economic Cooperation be authorized, in consul-
tation with the Council, to determine when aid for the fiscal
year 1949-50 should be on a loan basis and in what amount.
Prudent use of this discretionary power would keep the field
open for long-range investment prospects for private capital,
for Export-Import Bank financing, and for International Bank
loans.
Foreign gold and dollar balances
Prior to the start of ERP, many nations throughout western
Europe had drawn down their gold and dollar reserves in
order to purchase essential goods from the United States.
When the recovery program began, consideration was given to
the problem of whether further reduction in such reserves
should be made a requisite to receiving continued United States
assistance. The Council considered that such depletion of re-
serves should not be required, but that ECA allocations should
not be made for the specific purpose of building up foreign-
exchange reserves. 13
In the second year of the Marshall Plan the Executive sought
complete discretion over the allocation of foreign aid between loans
and grants. The authorizing legislation accorded this discretion, but
the Appropriations Act provided that $150 million could only be
made available on credit terms.' By early 1950 the economists
noted a "marked reversal of the postwar trend" of European reserves,
but still clung persistently to the policy that foreign aid "should be
predominantly on a grant basis." Even when the United States
experienced a net outward movement of gold of $1 billion, and the
foreign accumulation of gold and dollar reserves for the first 9 months
of 1950 was at an annual rate of $3.7 billion,16 the economists still
13Report of NAC for the period October 1, 1948, to March 31, 1949.
14Report of NAC for the period April 1, 1949, to September 30, 1949.
15 Report of NAC for the period October 1, 1949, to March 31, 1950,
pp. 8 and 12.
1; Report of NAC for the period April 1, 1950, to September 30, 1950, p. 9.
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adhered to the view that it would be "unwise to extend any substan-
tial amount of loans in the immediate future." "
Foreign reserves of gold and dollars continued to rise by another
billion in the six month period from October 1, 1950, to March 31,
1951, ECA aid was suspended to major European countries, but a
new form of assistance took its place-military aid for NATO, infra,
p. 416. Looking at the past policy of foreign aid, the National
Advisory Council commented with obvious self-satisfaction:
The inception of the European Recovery Program in April,
1948, worked a shift in emphasis of U.S. Government foreign
aid from loans to grants, and this trend has continued up to
the present. Thus grant programs account for approximately
2.1 billion dollars, or nearly 90% of total foreign assistance
utilized in the period under review.'
As to the future, the NAC repeated its policy against loans as
follows:
For the fiscal year 1952, the Council recommended that
extraordinary economic assistance to participating countries
should be on a grant basis and that military assistance should
be provided on a grant basis or against cash payment, and not,
on a loan basis.'9
The new criterion was no longer the size of reserves or the
volume of trade or the amount of debt of the aid recipients, but a
new formula:
The Council agreed that, under current conditions, United
States foreign assistance should be dictated primarily by con-
siderations of mutual defense. Economic assistance on a grant
basis should not be extended for the purpose of increasing gold
and dollar reserves, nor should countries participating in the
defense effort be required to reduce their present level of reserves
as a prerequisite for receiving United States aid.
Economic assistance to underdeveloped areas is ordinarily
not extended to meet balance of payments deficits, but rather
to provide technical assistance and to increase real resources
available for development purposes, and is not expected
materially to affect dollar reserves. 20
As the reserves of European countries continued to rise, the
17 Ibid., p. 13.
18 Report of NAC for the period October 1, 1950, to March 31, 1951, p. 6.
10 Ibid, p. 9.
20 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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NAC changed the formulation slightly, but the policy continued to
be the same:
The Council concluded, however, that where a country is making
satisfactory contribution to mutual defense, an unanticipated
accumulation of reserves resulting from the vigorous application
of appropriate economic and financial policies should not auto-
matically result in a reduction of aid.* * * The Council
strongly reaffirmed its view that extraordinary economic
assistance to ERP countries should be provided on a grant
basis. 21
Again that view was reaffirmed as to the mutual security program,
in which loans should be used only to the extent specifically required
by the Congress."
What happened, however, was that Europe did recover, and
spectacularly, especially after its own currency reforms and devalua-
tions, and that the French franc, the German mark, and the Italian
lira became much desired currencies. French and German gold re-
serves have been soaring while those of the United States have been
tumbling down because European holders of dollars prefer gold to
dollars. (See Chart I.)
If instead of largely forgotten grants-and the total grants by
the United States to France aggregate $71/2 billion-we now had
some Marshall Plan loans repayable by France with her excellent
gold and reserves, all of the current gold problems of the United
States, resulting from French demands for gold, would vanish. The
loans-and-grant policy of our foreign aid program was one of the
monumental blunders of economic forecasting in this or any other
century."' The blunders arose from the fact that the men who made
the decisions on the foreign-aid program had really no confidence
in their big plans.
21 Report at NAC for the period April 1, 1951, to September 30, 1951, pp. 14-
15.
-- Reports of NAC for the period October 1, 1951, to March 31, 1952, p. 13;
for the period July 1 to December 31, 1954, p. 24; for the period January 1
to June 30, 1957, p. 30.
23 If the author, who served at the time as one of the Treasury's lawyers
concerned with ERP, be accused of having 20-20 hindsight, his defense is
that the Treasury files contain memoranda authored by him specifically ad-
vocating local-currency loans (as distinguished from the "counterpart funds"
which were usable by the United States only to a very limited extent) rather
than grants. If the United States now had drawing rights in French francs,
deutschemarks, lire, etc., the Secretary of the Treasury would have to devote
less time to worrying about our recurrent balance-of-payments crises.
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Perhaps one can understand the generosity in the first years of
the Marshall Plan when uncertainty over the future was the order
of the day. But can one fathom the blind persistence of this generosity
when the evidence began to accrue of the loss of U.S. gold and the
surging increases in European gold and dollar reserves? Was not
this the time to call a halt for a searching financial examination of
U.S. policies?
In the more recent past, especially since 1958, the foreign aid
program has been returning to a "loan" basis of a sort, but these
loans are largely in terms of repayment in local currencies instead of
dollars and lack any maintenance-of-value clauses. Thus, the United
States loses to the extent of any devaluation or depreciation of local
currencies. For example, the U.S. Treasury has been selling Indo-
nesian rupiahs at an exchange rate of 5,000 to $1 in comparison to
U.S. acquisition cost of those currencies under loan agreements at
an exchange rate of 45 to $1, a loss on the Indonesian currency loans
of more than $.99 on the dollar.
Military "Pay-as-you-go" Abroad Means Huge Cash Transfers to
Foreign Countries
U.S. military operations abroad in the past several decades have
included large disbursements-aggregating $24 billions for the years
1950-1960.2 These expenditures were not only for the payment of
our troops and their overseas dependents, but also for the payment of
foreign troops, various kinds of military assistance, and various sup-
porting operations, such as construction and maintenance of military
bases, communications and transportation facilities, use of local real
estate for airfields, storage, vast housing developments, and local
labor and supplies-even something called "offshore procurement" 25
and "infrastructure." 26 More than half the foreign military expendi-
tures were in Western Europe ($13 billion), with more than half in
turn going to France ($3.2 billions) and Germany ($3.5).
24 Department of Commerce, Statistical Supplement to Balance of Payments,
Table 41,'p. 148.
25 That is, procurement of equipment and supplies obtained outside the
United States (i.e., "offshore") for delivery to our allies. Frequently such
"offshore procurement" was made with one NATO member for delivery to
another NATO member. The Department of Commerce reported that "off-
shore procurement" was in excess of $3 billions for the period 1950-1960,
op. cit., n. 20, Table 42, p. 148.
26 That is, headquarters, training, communications, and transportation com-
plex-buildings, pipelines, telecommunications, airfields, etc.
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As already stated in the opening of this article, the United States
could carry out the far-flung military operations of World War II
without then experiencing any balance-of-payments difficulties. The
reason was that under lend-lease and reverse lend-lease, there were
few if any transfers of credits or cash between the United States and
foreign countries.
Under lend-lease the United States furnished its military allies
with all the military hardware, guns, airplanes, tanks, ammunition,
clothing, food stuffs, and the use of ships. This was done on-the-cuff.
In return, the United States received as reverse lend-lease, in the
U.K. and later in France and other European countries, use of local
real estate for flying fields, barracks, storage depots, maneuvering,
local commodities, and services.27 Thus the Reciprocal Aid Agree-
ment with the United Kingdom, September 3, 1942, para. 2, provided
as follows:
It is the understanding of the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general
principle to be applied, to the point at which the common war
effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of
the articles and services which each Government may authorize
to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal
aid so that the need for each Government for the currency of
the other may be reduced to a minimum [emphasis added]. 28
27 The definition of reciprocal aid in para. 3 of the British Reciprocal Aid
Agreement of September 3, 1942, reads as follows:
"(a) Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.
"(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States
forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative
expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make
other than through the official establishments of the Government of the United
Kingdom as specified in paragraph 4.
"(c) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military
projects, tasks and similar capital works required for the common war effort
in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire, except for the
wages and salaries of United States citizens.
"(d) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such
military projects, tasks and capital works in territory other than the United
Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire is a more practicable source of supply
than the United States or another of the United Nations." E. R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Lend Lease (19 4 4), pp. 382-83.
For a colorful description of the vast variety of reverse lend-lease, also see
pp. 183-184, 200-201 (Australia and New Zealand); 216 (India); 308, 310-322,
338 (U.K.).
28 Stettinius, op. cit., p. 382.
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When the war ended, the accounts were struck, and all military
items were written off. The United States asked, and received, small
payment extending over 30 years only for those items of lend-lease
which survived the war and which had a civilian utility. In addition,
items still in procurement on "pipeline" were sold at cost plus ocean
shipping. The settlements also included the disposal of surplus mili-
tary equipment and supplies and arrangements for inter-govern-
mental claims.29
With the termination of Lend-Lease, U.S. military forces in
foreign lands gradually emerged as important dollar earners for the
host countries. One would think that the military would have pre-
ferred to continue the same methods of operation that had proved
so eminently successful in the winning of World War II. However,
the Army had powerful incentives for going over to a new basis-
called pay-as-you-go. This came about as follows:
As the United States made plans for the liberation of Europe
from German control, it was necessary to plan first for the military
occupation of the liberated areas. The pervasive operations of eco-
nomic warfare by Germany, as well as by the United States, required
an entirely new currency in the initial phases of the liberation."0 This
military currency retained the same name as the local currency, i.e.,
the allied military lira or the allied military mark. The Treasury,
which played a predominant role in the financial planning of military
liberation and occupation, insisted, during the issuance of military
currency by American forces, upon debiting the appropriations of
the Army, and to a corresponding extent the Navy, for the dollar
equivalents of the amount of military currency distributed. These
debits were accumulated in a special suspense account designated as
the Allied Military Lira Account and the Allied Military Mark
Account.
In the case of Italy, the Allied Military Lira Account was in
29 For general description of the lend-lease settlements, see the 23rd Report
to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.
30 After some extended legal surveys of the international authorities, the
Treasury had concluded that a military occupant, whether of a liberated area
or of an enemy area, had power under international law to issue new military
currency and to make the obligation of redeeming such currency an obligation
of the occupied area, again whether liberated or enemy. These provisions
were, of course, set forth in some detail in the Italian and German armistice
agreements. For the Treasury legal opinion, see 80th Cong., 1st Session,
Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Banking Hear-
ings on Currency Transactions (1947), pp. 73-94.
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a plus condition throughout. However, as Italy's needs for dollars
developed, a decision was first made to transfer to Italy for use in
civilian relief and reconstruction the dollar equivalent of the allied
military lira used to pay the American troops on the ground that
Americans were not mercenaries but paid their own troops. As the
economic situation in Italy worsened, plans were then made to
transfer to Italy the balance of the allied military lira accounts. These
plans were dictated by foreign-policy considerations based on the
need to rehabilitate Italy, even though the armistice had specifically
provided that Italy should redeem the military lira currency. Un-
doubtedly, these dollars were used to good effect in Italy and were
the beginning of aid to that country when it was needed immediately
and desperately.
In the case of the Allied Military Mark currency, however, that
account was discovered in deficit in late 1945 and early 1946, to the
surprise and chagrin of the military planners. The Army had re-
deemed one billion dollars more of allied military marks than it had
issued in the German area under its occupation." This meant that
not only was there no dollar equivalent available for the marks that
had been issued, but there was now a large deficit in the accounts of
the Army. Allied military mark currencies were also issued by other
allied forces, such as the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union, and these military currencies were substantially indistinguish-
able from one another.
When the deficit came up, there were detailed discussions be-
tween the Army and the rest of the Executive Branch. The Treasury
suggested that the Army should report the deficit and ask for Con-
gressional authorization to write off the deficit. The Army completely
opposed this suggestion on the ground that it never had had a deficit
of this kind and it did not want to start now. The Army proposed to
recoup the dollar loss by selling the excess military marks to the
repatriated German prisoners-of-war in the United States who had
accumulated dollars for their labor, and also by selling the marks to
our soldiers and the military establishment in Germany to be used in
paying for various services provided by the German economy, such as
hotels, servants, and local supplies, which had previously been fur-
nished free to the United States under the armistice terms. These
31 The Army reported to Congress in 1947 that at that time it had excess
holdings of $380 million, but unpublished Treasury estimates placed the
maximum excess closer to $1 billion.
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transactions resulted in the gradual elimination of the dollar deficit
in the military mark account over a period of several years. While
this solution was first looked upon with some disfavor by the foreign-
aid planners, they noted very quickly that, while the Army solution
might initially deprive the German economy of dollar earnings, it
established the principle that the United States would go over to a
pay-as-you-go basis for the local support of our military operation
with consequent dollar earnings by Germany, and accordingly they
warmly supported the Army's approach. Once the deficit had been
worked off, the military establishments found themselves under the
precedent of paying everywhere in cash for local facilities and services.
This precedent resulted in very substantial earnings of foreign
exchange by such countries as Germany and France in which large
United States forces have been maintained for decades. In major
part, the tremendous growth in French and German gold holdings in
the 1950's can be explained on this basis, as a comparison of Charts
I & II dramatically demonstrates. Of course, as those countries as-
sumed military obligations under NATO, they have been sharing some
of the burden, particularly in the case of Germany, which in recent
years has provided the largest land contingent in the NATO forces.
This sharing is not true of France, now only a token participant in
NATO, while the NATO infrastructure arrangement became one of
the principal dollar earners of the French. At various times there was
talk in NATO circles of the "burden sharing exercise," but it remained
largely a burden for the United States and an "exercise" for the rest.
The aid planners probably enjoyed the cynicism of their humorous
choice of words-"exercise"!
Thus were the weeds sown for the coming deficits in the balance
of payments of the United States. Like other weeds, they were not
deliberately planted, but their spread was preventable, as the record
of the United States in World War II so clearly demonstrates. Pos-
sibly the weeds grew through over-confidence and inattention.
The first seeding of the weeds of the military deficit was the
gradual and rather accidental change in the financial objectives and
techniques of the military in maintaining and then expanding forces
scattered throughout the world with missions which were not always
sufficiently recognized to win local support. Gone were the days of
Lend-Lease and reciprocal aid in a struggle for survival when the
host countries were equally devoted with the United States to a com-
mon cause in which they contributed the local-currency costs of the
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common defense. No NATO ally, or any other ally since the ending
of World War II, has furnished reciprocal aid to the degree and with
the will displayed in the proud performance of the United Kingdom
in World War II. Instead the United States embraced and championed
"pay as you go" as a first principle, and since the United States did
the "going" by maintaining troops and dispatching equipment abroad,
it also did the "paying." The presence of U.S. military forces within
a host country became an automatic guaranty of financial prosperity
for the host, as witness the growth of the hosts' gold (Chart I). But
did the embrace of "pay as you go" win for the United States any
more devotedly dependable allies than the opposite policy had in
World War II?
Gone also were the days of the type of settlement that was con-
templated and effected under Lend-Lease: "As for the settlement,"
said Stettinius in 1944, "that could wait until the danger had passed,
and we could take stock of how we and our neighbors stood." 3" No,
the settlements were rushed out (in boilerplate style for all the aid
recipients) as the aid was gushing out. Those settlements were made
at times that stressed the hopelessness of most of the world and con-
sequently were in terms of grants and the shell game whose name was
counterpart funds. What if the aid agreements could have kept open
the options until the "recovery" phase of the European Recovery
Program had become a fact! Or if the United States had taken loan
commitments that could have been adjusted downward if the "re-
covery" were in fact less than called for in the "program"!
Today the United States furnishes the spectacle of pleading with
former aid recipients to cooperate with the dollar, while we are
peddling war equipment and bonds to host countries to offset the
local-currency costs of maintaining U.S. forces for the common de-
fense of host and paying guest. What a contrast to the objectives,
techniques, and results of Lend-Lease!
As for the balance of payments of the United States itself, that
was largely assumed to be a non-existent problem, as one now peruses
the successive semi-annual and annual reports of the NAC for the
period from 1947 to 1966. These reports cite the balance of pay-
ments as a problem for the United States only twice in those two
decades-once in the semi-annual report for the period July to De-
cember, 1960, and the other in the following report for the period
32 Stettinius, op. cit., p. 4.
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January to June, 1961. Even then the consideration of the balance-
of-payments problem of the United States was confined, so far as
the NAC reports reveal, to reprinting in the appendices statements
by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. For the rest the NAC reports
have been silent on the balance-of-payments problem of the United
States.
When the balance-of-payments problem became more pressing
for the United States in 1963-1964, the attack was focused on private
lending and private investment abroad, rather than on foreign aid
and foreign military expenditures and assistance. The private sectors
presumably constituted easier targets that were available in ways that
did not involve the vested interests and techniques of government.
Hence, it was concluded to tax and control private lending and invest-
ment rather than to reform foreign aid and the military. Moreover,
these taxes and controls fitted in with the need felt for allocation of
sacrifice in the current crises.
II. The Interest Equalization Tax
The first measure in defense of the balance of payments of the
United States was the Interest Equalization Tax " signed into law on
September 2, 1964, but made retroactive to July 18, 1963, when it
had first been proposed to the Congress by President Kennedy. This
legislation is currently scheduled to expire July 31, 1969.
The purpose of the new tax was to reduce the demand on
American capital markets from borrowers in industrialized countries
by using a graduated excise tax of 15% on the acquisition by persons
of stocks of foreign issuers, except in connection with direct invest-
ment, and by applying a tax of varying amount on debt obligations,
depending upon the length of maturity of the debt. This tax ranges
from 2 % to 15% if the securities are held for more than x number
of years.
The tax was originally described as a temporary tax to expire
at the end of two years. Thus, it was originally limited to the period
ending on December 31, 1965. It has been twice extended by Con-
gress, first to end on July 31, 1967, (Public Law 89-243, § 2) and
later to end on July 31, 1969 (Public Law 90-59, § 2). The reasons
for its temporary nature and the successive renewals were errors in
judgment as to the time required to protect the balance-of-payments
33 26 U.S.C. 4911, et seq.
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position of the United States. It was constantly hoped that this posi-
tion would improve rather than deteriorate. Since, however, the
balance-of-payments position of the United States may not improve
significantly by the termination date of July 31, 1969, there is every
expectation there will be a further extension of the Act. However,
the investing community has now become sufficiently accustomed to
the tax that it is unlikely that further renewal would present any
serious congressional problems. The legislation did not initially
apply to transactions in advanced stages of negotiation at the time
of the announcement of the proposed tax by the President on July
18, 1963.
According to the Treasury's recent study (1968) the major
motivation for the increased borrowing by other industrialized
countries in the U.S. capital market was the higher level of
interest rates prevailing in these countries rather than a need
on the part of the foreign borrowers for foreign exchange.
The purpose of the IET was to compensate for this interest
rate differential by increasing by the equivalent of 1 % per year
the cost to borrowers from other industrialized countries of
raising long-term capital in the U.S. market. * * *
The IET was not designed to halt completely the outflow of
private portfolio capital from the U.S. to the countries con-
cerned, but rather to restrain the rate of outflow to a more
normal level and thus relieve the pressure on the U.S. balance-
of-payments position.3
4
The tax legislation employs language which is exceedingly com-
plicated and highly technical. If ever any proof were necessary for
the detailed controls that are evolving out of the balance-of-payments
controls, the interest equalization tax is a foreboding example. The
exemptions contained in it are exceptionally numerous and reflect
the responses of Congress to a great variety of pressures brought on
behalf of specific persons or groups that believed they would be
adversely affected by the tax. The general justification for these
exemptions is that the tax was not intended to apply to transactions
that are necessary for the normal conduct of international business,
provided that they do not have significantly adverse effects upon the
balance of payments of the United States. However, with the vast
growth of international transactions in the post-war period the con-
cept of "normal" has obviously been growing in all directions.
34 Treasury, op. cit., n. 7, Tab. D, p. 1.
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The major exemptions of the interest equalization tax are as
follows:
(1) Prior American ownership. The interest equalization tax
does not apply to foreign securities purchased from an owner who is
a United States person.3" A signed certificate of prior American
ownership in connection with the acquisition of foreign security is
considered adequate proof of prior American ownership unless the
person receiving the certificate has actual knowledge that the certifi-
cate is false. There have already been prosecutions instituted for
false certificates. In the case of securities purchased on most registered
national securities exchanges, or from a member of a national securi-
ties association registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the purchaser may normally rely upon a written confirmation
of the transaction and need not obtain a certificate of American
ownership.
(2) Direct investments. The interest equalization tax does not
apply to direct, as distinguished from portfolio investment." Direct
investment is defined as acquisitions by U.S. persons of stock or debt
obligations where immediately after the acquisition the U.S. person
owns, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the combined voting
power of all classes of stock of the foreign corporation." The same
exemption is also available to the acquisition of an interest in a
partnership.
(3) Less-developed countries. The interest equalization tax
does not apply to acquisitions of debt obligations issued or guaranteed
by a national or local government of a less-developed country, stock
or debt obligations of a less-developed country corporation, debt
obligations issued by individuals or partnerships resident in less-
developed countries, and certain reinvestments required by the laws
of the less-developed countries. 8 The designation of less-developed
countries is set forth in E.O. 11285. No country within the Sino-
Soviet bloc may be designated as a less-developed country for plirposes
of the tax. 9 The Treasury has established procedures for determining
when a corporation can qualify as a less-developed-country corpora-
tion., in general under the 80% rule.
35 26 U.S.C. 4918.
36 26 U.S.C. 4915.
37 26 U.S.C. 4916 (a) (1).
31 26 U.S.C. 4916.
89 26 U.S.C. 4916 (b) and § 2 of E.O. 11285.
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(4) Commercial bank loans. The interest equalization tax origi-
nally exempted debt obligations acquired by commercial banks in
making loans in the ordinary course of commercial banking business."0
This was done on the assumption that most commercial bank loans
would fall within the maturity range of less than three years and
therefore would not in any event be subject to the tax originally
imposed. The exemption was also based on the assumption that most
foreign loans by banks are related to U.S. exports. The legislation,
however, authorized the President to bring commercial bank loans
with maturities of three years or more under the tax if he determined
that such loans were impairing the effectiveness of the tax, and the
President was also empowered to impose a tax on debt obligations
with a maturity of one to three years acquired by commercial banks.4'1
These steps were taken under Executive Order 11198 whereby, acting
under the authority of § 4931 of the Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, the President invoked the Gore Amendment and imposed
the tax on commercial bank loans having a maturity of one year or
more.4 2 This was done at the same time that a comprehensive, volun-
tary balance-of-payments program for banks and other businesses
investing abroad was announced, infra, pp. 423-429. However, the
Gore Amendment contained express exclusion in § 4931(d) (1) for
acquisitions by commercial banks of debt obligations, regardless of
their duration, arising from export transactions. This exclusion was
further incorporated in the Executive Order and the Treasury regula-
tions. The Executive Order also continued the exemption for invest-
ments in and loans to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks and for loans
by foreign branches of U.S. banks.
(5) Export financing. There are a series of detailed exemp-
tions for foreign stock and debt obligations acquired as a result of
U.S. export transactions; guaranties by U.S. Government agencies,
such as the Export-Import Bank; exemption for goods produced in
the United States if 85 % or more of the purchase price is attributable
to the sale of such property or to the performance of services by U.S.
persons or both; the exemption for U.S.-producing exporters in
exchange for foreign stock or debt obligations; the export of intangi-
ble property rights, such as the sale or licensing of patents, inventions,
copyrights, secret processes, trademarks, goodwill, etc. There are
40 26 U.S.C. 491 (b) (2).
4 1 26 U.S.C. 4931.
42 At 26 U.S.C.A., pp. 456-57.
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also exemptions for export-related loans.43 Thus acquisition of a debt
obligation is exempt from the tax if the U.S. person making the loan
and receiving the debt obligation shows that the proceeds of the loan
will be used for storage, handling, transportation, processing, pack-
aging, or servicing outside the United States of property substantially
produced, grown, or extracted by the lender in the United States.
(6) International monetary stability. In view of the near panic
condition that immediately developed in Canada upon the President's
announcement of the new tax, the statute authorized the President
to exempt from the interest equalization tax new security issues of a
foreign country where he determined that the application of the tax
would imperil or threaten to imperil the stability of the international
monetary system.44 It was understood that this exemption at the time
applied only to Canada.4" Later, the exemption was extended by
Executive Order to cover Japan up to an aggregate annual amount of
$100 million of new debt obligations issued or guaranteed by the
Japanese government. 6
(7) U.S. underwriters and security dealers. U.S. underwriters
and dealers in foreign securities are subject to the interest equalization
tax when they buy a foreign security for a U.S. person.4" However,
if a sale is subsequently made to a foreign person, the underwriter or
dealer may claim a credit or refund of the tax.
(8) Stock of foreign corporations controlled and traded in the
U.S. Certain foreign corporations are treated as domestic corpora-
tions with respect to certain classes of their stock for purposes of the
interest equalization tax, thus exempting the purchases of such classes
of stock from the tax." Any class of stock in a foreign corporation
traded on the U.S. securities exchange qualifies for this treatment if
the trading on such exchanges represented the principal market for
such class of stock during 1962 and if more than 60% of such class
of stock was held by U.S. persons on the latest record date before
July 19, 1963. Lists of securities qualifying under this exemption
have been made available by the principal U.S. stock exchanges. Any
class of stock of a foreign corporation also qualifies for exemption
43 26 U.S.C. 4914 (c).
44 26 U.S.C. 4917.
45E.O. 11175, at 26 U.S.C.A., p. 425.
46 E.O. 11211, at 26 U.S.C.A., pp. 425-26.
47 26 U.S.C. 4919.
48 26 U.S.C. 4914 (i).
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if 65% of such class of stock was owned by U.S. persons on the
latest record date before July 19, 1963.
The Treasury has appraised the effect of the interest equalization
tax as follows:
After the adoption of the IET new foreign security issues
subject to the tax have virtually ceased. U.S. transactions with
foreigners in outstanding foreign stocks and bonds, which had
regularly resulted in substantial net U.S. purchases for years
prior to the IET, shifted to net sales from the middle of 1963
through 1966. For the first three quarters of 1967, there was
a resumption of net purchases but on a very limited scale.
Long-term commercial bank loan commitments to foreigners
in countries subject to the IET have fallen to a small fraction
of the pre-tax level, as compared with only a moderate reduc-
tion in commitments to countries not covered by the tax. 9
Table II shows the statistical effect of the tax on the market in
foreign-issued securities.
III. Voluntary Controls over Foreign Lending and Investment
The legislative process of enacting the interest equalization tax
into law took far longer than the Executive had anticipated. During
this period, however, it had been repeatedly stated that the tax would
be retroactive to the date of the President's proposal. This warning
and attendant uncertainty as to the effective date and scope of the
statute-to-be were successful in reducing the acquisition of foreign
securities by U.S. citizens and corporations to an extraordinary degree
(see Table II). However, during this waiting time there was substan-
tial increase in the outflow of capital abroad in the form of bank and
other credits which were expressly excluded from the initial form of
the interest equalization tax. Accordingly, when President Johnson
announced on February 10, 1965, that he was invoking the Gore
Amendment to extend the interest equalization tax to commercial
bank loans having a maturity of one year or more, supra, he also an-
nounced that there would be instituted a program for a voluntary
effort by U.S. banks and other business to reduce foreign trans-
actions."0
49 Treasury, op. cit., n. 7, Tab. D, p. 2.
50 E.O. 11198.
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TABLE II
New Issues of Foreign Securities Purchased
by U.S. Residents, by Area, 1962-1966
($ millions)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
First Second First
Half Half -Half *
TOTAL NEW ISSUES 1,076 999 251 1,063 1,206 1,210 758
JET Countries:
West Europe 195 219 53 20 80 15 -
Japan 101 107 57 - 52 4 -
Other 1 60 17 - - - -
Subtotal 356 343 110 20 132 19 -
Of which:
(i) Subject to IET - - 80 9 -
(ii) Exempt from IET: 110 20 52 10 -
Reason:
a) Commitments made




tion (-) (-) (52) (-) (-)
d) Other (-) (11) (-) (10)
Other Countries:
Canada 457 608 85 700 709 9225 497
Latin America 2 102 13 23 208 37 69 58
Other countries 77 35 33 131 149 120 98
International
institutions 84 - - 4 179 80 104
Subtotal 720 656 141 1,043 1,074 1,191 757
1 Australia, New Zealand, South Africa.
2 Includes Latin American Development Bank issue of $145 million in 1964.
8 Issue had maturity less than three years, which was lowest maturity to which tax had applied
prior to February 11, 1965.
4 Issue by United Kingdom subsidiary of Canadian firm.
5 Before deducting $162 million of Canadian Government purchases from U.S. residents of
outstanding Canadian and other foreign securities in accordance with Canada's agreement not
to let its foreign exchange reserves rise as a result of borrowing in the U.S.
Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Maintaining the Strength of the United States Dollar in
a Strong Free World Economy (1968), Table 15 (p. 120), Tab B, Table 1.
A. Business Investment
On February 18, 1965, the U.S. Department of Commerce is-
sued a statement of general policy requesting voluntary cooperation
from the business community in effecting investments abroad." Dur-
ing the week of March 14, 1965, a form letter sent by the Secretary
of Commerce to some 600 U.S. corporations having substantial
foreign business operations contained an appeal for the support of
the program and requested the furnishing of certain financial infor-
mation to the Department of Commerce and a quarterly reprinting
program containing data on past transactions (including 1964 as a
whole) and quarterly projections for the following year.5 This letter
placed more emphasis upon a flexible voluntary program of improve-
51 Department of Commerce Press Release, dated February 18, 1965.
52 Ibid., dated February 24, 1965.
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ments for each company. Among the principal points made were
the following:
1. United States firms with foreign investments of $10 million or
more at the end of 1964 or exports of $10 million or more were asked
individually to participate in the program to achieve an average im-
provement of 15% to 20% in 1965 in the overall performance in the
balance of payments by United States corporations, as compared with
1964.
2. Wherever possible short-term assets (mainly interest-bearing
bank deposits and short-term commercial and government obliga-
tions) should not be increased above the volume outstanding on De-
cember 31, 1964, and should, wherever possible, be reduced to the
level outstanding at the end of 1963.
3. The chief executive of each firm was asked to return with
each questionnaire a commentary describing the steps they had taken
to achieve the improvement indicated and the reasons for shortfalls,
if any.
4. Each participating firm was requested to notify the Secretary
of Commerce of new investment projects of $10 million or more to
be undertaken in developed foreign countries. The notification in-
cluded a general outline of the proposed financing.
5. Business firms were encouraged to pursue a number of poli-
cies to improve the balance in 1965 by alternative means:
a. Expansion of exports through independent channels and to
or through foreign affiliates.
b. Development of new export markets in countries in which
they are not active.
c. Acceleration in the repatriation of income earned in de-
veloped countries.
d. Avoidance or postponement of direct investment in marginal
projects and in projects which do not quickly result in higher
exports or investment incomes in developed countries with funds
raised in the United States or earned abroad and which would
ordinarily be repatriated.
e. Greater use of funds raised in developed countries to finance
direct investments in those countries, although the financing
charges are higher than in the United States.
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f. Sale of equities in foreign subsidiaries to residents of the
host countries.
g. Increased use of American flag vessels and airlines.
h. Minimization of the outflow of short-term financial funds and
orderly repatriation of such funds previously invested abroad.
In 1965, direct investment by a particular company was not
subjected to special analysis apart from its inclusion as one factor
entering into the overall balance-of-payments performance. However,
in 1966, specific company guidelines for direct investment were
imposed.5" These guidelines limited each corporation's direct invest-
ment for the two-year period 1965-1966, to 90% of that corporation's
direct foreign investment during a base period of 1962-1964. Insofar
as corporations had made sizable foreign investments in 1965, they
were severely restricted in 1966, while those with modest direct invest-
ments direct and outflows in 1965 could well have quite a lot of room
in which to maneuver in 1966.
The Commerce Department required that the participating com-
panies file detailed forms showing the amounts available for foreign
investment in 1966. Worksheet 1 was required of each company in
which it made a forecast of its 1966 transactions which would have
significant effects upon the balance of payments. Worksheet 2 was
required of each company to compute its direct investment target.
In addition, the companies filed quarterly worksheets reporting the
actual transactions upon which the estimates of Worksheet 1 were
made. The number of companies requested by the Department of
Commerce to participate in voluntary programs rose from 500 in
1965 to approximately 900 in 1966. It is estimated that the 900
companies account for the great majority of total foreign investment
by U.S. companies. It is understood, however, that reports had not
been received from many companies and that the response from some
of the smaller companies included in the request was regarded as
disappointing.
The voluntary restraints applied only to selected transactions.
Thus all imports and all transactions with less-developed countries
have been outside the scope of the voluntary program and were not
restrained in any way. Canada has been largely exempt from the
program upon a kind of gentlemen's agreement that it would not run
53 5 Int. Leg. Materials, 30, et seq., (Jan., 1966).
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up its gold stock at the expense of the United States. Other significant
balance-of-payments items, such as royalties, fees, service charges, and
like transactions with unaffiliated foreign interests, so far have re-
ceived relatively little attention, although they usually represent a
substantial net benefit to the U.S. balance-of-payments position. The
Department of Commerce has usually been praising the effectiveness
of the program, whereas there has been considerable outside opinion
that it has not been effective to the degree claimed by the Department
of Commerce. One significant and novel development has been the
stimulation of European bond and debenture issues by specially or-
ganized financing subsidiaries of U.S. companies and the consequent
expansion of the European capital market. Undoubtedly, in many
instances, the voluntary controls cost the postponement and resched-
uling of a certain amount of investment in developed countries, but
this had the concomitant effect of building up a backlog of deferred
investments with relatively high foreign exchange requirements. There
has also been a rapid and ingenious construction of financial syndi-
cates for raising long-term capital in Europe to be used in the foreign
operations of American companies in the place of U.S. funds to
which they have had access in the past. Of course, this has consider-
ably raised the cost of such funds to the American investor.
B. Loans by Commercial Banks
Detailed guidelines for commercial banks were issued by the
Federal Reserve Board on March 5, 1965, 5  outlining the following
points:
1. All commercial banks should restrict credits to foreigners, in-
cluding loans and investments, acceptances and deposits, and particu-
larly those which are not clearly and directly for the purpose of financ-
ing exports of the United States goods and services. The desired goal
is to hold outstanding credits other than export credits during 1965 to
a level not over 5 % above the amount outstanding on December 31,
1964, (which for all commercial banks was $10 billion). Banks
exceeding their 5 % target should act to reduce their claims to 105 %
of the base as quickly as possible.
2. The restraint is not applicable to export loans arranged by
the Export-Import Bank, loans with Export-Import Bank guarantees
5 Federal Reserve Board, Circular No. 5628.
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or insurance, and holdings of "Export-Import portfolio fund" partici-
pations.
3. The 5% goal applies whether the loans and other credits are
subject to the interest equalization tax or not.
4. Within the 5% guideline, absolute priorities should be con-
sidered for export credits and, in the case of no export credits, loans
to less developed countries, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
5. Banks were directed not to sell existing claims on foreigners
to United States residents and replace such assets with other loans
to foreigners. Banks with no previous foreign lending experience
were expected not to make foreign loans during 1965, other than in
the case of export financing in reasonable amounts, provided such
financing does not represent a shift from previous United States or
foreign sources of financing.
6. Foreign branches of United States banks were not to be
hampered in lending activities involving funds, including Euro-dollar
deposits, derived from foreign sources and not adding to the dollar
outflow.
7. Loans by a foreign Edge Act subsidiary of a United States
bank could be combined with the parent bank for purposes of the
program, or separate targets could be set for the parent bank and
the subsidiary.
8. The program was voluntary but involved reporting require-
ments and close consultation with the Federal Reserve Board.
C. Loans by Nonbank Financial Institutions
The Federal Reserve Board issued guidelines for foreign lending
activities of nonbank financial institutions on March 4, 1965.11 The
nonbank financial institutions include insurance companies, savings
banks, investment companies, mutual funds, finance companies, pen-
sion funds, charitable trusts and, foundations, and trust departments
of commercial banks. The program called for the following steps:
1. Liquid funds held abroad should be limited to the December
31, 1964, year-end total, and the longer term objective was to reduce
such investments to the December 31, 1963, level. Liquid invest-
ments are defined as dollar-denominated deposits in foreign banks
and foreign branches of United States banks, short-term securities of
foreign governments and their foreign instrumentalities, foreign com-
55Ibid., Circular No. 5627.
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mercial paper, finance company credits and bankers acceptances, and
all other negotiable instruments maturing in one year or less. Foreign
bank deposits in foreign currencies may be maintained to support
ordinary foreign business operations.
2. Investments other than liquid funds, with maturities of five
years or less, should not be increased by more than 5% during 1965
over the amount held at the end of 1964, without regard to the type
of instrument or the country of origin. Priorities should be given to
credits that directly finance United States exports.
3. Investments in foreign offices, branches, and subsidiaries were
limited to the fullest extent practicable during 1965. Ordinarily
expansion of credit to such foreign branches and subsidiaries should
be held within 5 %.
In marked contrast to the voluntary controls for business were
the controls over banks and other financial institutions. The banking
controls are quite simple in that they consist of nothing more than a
series of restraints on the growth of foreign lending operations of
U.S. financial institutions. This contrasted with the voluntary Com-
merce Department program, which must deal with different types of
capital flows and with the enormous variety of non-financial indus-
tries.
To a certain extent it was unrealistic to refer to the Federal
Reserve controls as voluntary, as E.O. 11387 (para. 2) clearly recog-
nizes. There seems to have been no question on the part of either the
Federal Reserve or the banks subject to its regulation that the program
would be promptly complied with in both letter and spirit. Moreover,
it should be noted that a few large banks and financial institutions
are responsible for the bulk of foreign lending.
IV. Mandatory Controls over Foreign Investment
The voluntary controls over business investment came to an
abrupt end with the issuance of E.O. 11387 on January 1, 1968,58
under 5(b) of the Trading-With-the-Enemy Act, as amended. 7 The
ostensible occasion for the mandatory controls was "the importance
of strengthening the balance-of-payments position of the United
States," according to the Executive Order. The new controls " speak
56 Corrected reissue of Federal Register, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Jan. 3, 1968).
5 12 U.S.C. 95 (a) or 50 War App. 5.
58 FDIR, n. 2 supra.
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in the language of prohibitions, requirements, and reports, with enu-
merated criminal sanctions. The "voluntary" controls of the Federal
Reserve Board, supra, also could become mandatory, at the option
of the "Fed" under § 2 of the Executive Order.
The mandatory controls are two-pronged-( 1) they prohibit the
transfer, whatever the form, of capital abroad unless licensed by the
Secretary of Commerce,59 and (2) they require the repatriation of
earnings from abroad and the reduction of bank deposits and other
short-term financial assets abroad."0 True, the scope of the controls
was still limited to "big" investors, involving transactions of a mini-
mum of $100,000 per year.61 Nor does an investor fall within the
scope of the mandatory controls unless he is a "direct" investor in the
sense, as originally defined under the interest equalization tax, supra,
namely, a person who directly or indirectly owns or acquires 10%
or more of the total combined voting power of any foreign national,
or has the right or power to receive, control, or otherwise enjoy 10%
or more of the earnings, receipts, income, or profits of any foreign
national; or has the right or power to receive, control, or otherwise
direct the disposition of 10% or more of the assets of any foreign
national.62
By first prohibiting or requiring almost anything, and then licens-
ing out various transactions, the new mandatory controls were pat-
terned upon the old Foreign Funds Control or Foreign Assets Control
of the Treasury, which have enjoyed such effective immunity from
judicial review.6" That form of control has also led to a remarkable
silence on the part of the business critics, who may still hope for
licenses or authorizations and hence do not speak up.64 To a lawyer
59 Subpart B, § 1000.201.
60 FDIR, Subpart B, § 1000.202 and 1000.203.
61 FDIR, Subpart E, § 1000.503.
62 FDIR, Subpart C, § 1000.304.
63 See Silesian American Corporation v. Clark, 332 U.S., 469, 92 L.Ed.
81 (1947); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 93 L. Ed. 1480 (1949); and Cikes
Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 96 L.Ed. 359 (1952).
64 In a column in the Wall Street Journal for Feb. 23, 1968, entitled "Money
Controls Kindle Academic Ire," Richard F. Janssen notes:
"Yet, in public at least the only walls reverberating with any angry attack
are the ivied battlements of academe, where scholars of international finance
and Constitutional law reside; the business community's reaction has been re-
markably restrained.
"True, the relative anonymity of trade groups like the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce may eventually make them a collective outlet for corporate dissent.
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not initiated in the esoteric draftsmanship of the Trading-With-the-
Enemy regulations, the new mandatory controls and their bewildering
terminology may usher in an entirely new world, largely uncharted
and with uncertain shoals and reefs, while stormy weather lurks no
one knows quite where. The lawyer's best hope in advising a client
is, so far, to obtain some kind of authorization or license, which tends,
in many cases, to be oral. The confusion was initially compounded
by inadvertent typographical errors which have now been corrected.
The prohibitions on capital transfers apply to the transfer of
credits, payments between, by, through, or to any banking institution
-and almost anybody is a "banking institution" under the definitions
-transactions in foreign exchange or relating to any property located
in a foreign country. 5 The mandatory controls define "banking insti-
tution," as did the Treasury regulations of World War II, as "any
person holding credits for others." 6 Except for the aggregate dollar
limitation of $100,000, anybody can qualify as a "banking institu-
tion," since he at some time or other owes money to someone else,
however short the period. If this definition is not broad enough, the
new controllers are authorized to write their own definitions.6" This
is innovative even under the Trading-With-the-Enemy Act and its
sweeping regulations.
The mandatory controls classify the world (except for Canada,
which was specially exempted) 6 into three main categories: (1) The
"A" countries of the less-developed countries,6" as listed in § 4916
of the Internal Revenue Code, (2) the "B" countries "' which include
But so far, individual businesses are mostly limiting themselves to polite
petitions for clarification or for an occasional exemption.
"Reasons for Reticence
There's an unpleasant reason for this reticence, charges Prof: Robert A.
Mundell, a University of Chicago economist: 'Any acquiescence to the
controls is based on the special interests of the lobbies hoping for special
exemptions and fearful of reprisals if they do react publicly against the Gov-
ernment's policy.' "
65 FDIR, Subpart B, § 1000.201(a).
66 FDIR, Subpart C, § 1000.311. The sweeping definition of "an institution"
in the Treasury wartime freezing controls was specifically upheld by the
Supreme Court in Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, at p. 479, 93 L.Ed. 1480
(1949).
67 § 3 of E.O. 11387.
06 Fed. Register, March 12, 1968, p. -.
69 FDIR, Subpart C, § 1000.319(a).
7 0 Ibid., 1000.319(b).
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many developed countries, such as the United Kingdom, Canada,
Japan, and Australia, and also some less-developed countries that are
very important to U.S. industry, such as the oil areas, and (3) the
"C" countries or the rest of the world.' The "B" countries are char-
acterized by the fact that they are actively cooperating with the
United States in the defense of the dollar against attack by gold
hoarders.
This country classification is to a certain extent a lazy classifica-
tion in that it builds upon distinctions already drawn in the tax laws
for entirely different purposes and different times. The system fails to
recognize that there are many less-developed countries which have
intimate financial relationships with highly developed countries, such
as France, which are embarked upon a major onslaught on the dollar.
The result of that relationship is that the exemption of countries as
less-developed provides a major source of seepage of U.S. funds into
France. It would make far more sense to classify the countries into
two categories, namely, (A) the countries which enter into satisfac-
tory financial arrangements with the Secretary of the Treasury of the
United States for the cooperative defense of the dollar, and (B) coun-
tries which do not. If it were politically necessary to make some
special treatment of the western hemisphere, then there should be
exclusion of those areas, such as Caribbean islands, which do not
cooperate with the defense of the dollar. As time passes this classi-
fication of countries will come under more critical scrutiny.
The controls permit transfer of capital 72 to schedule "A" coun-
tries up to 110% of the average of direct investment by the direct
investor in all Schedule "A" countries during the base years 1965 and
1966. Transfers to a Schedule "B" country are limited to 65% of
the base period, while a complete "moratorium" is placed on transfers
to any Schedule "C" country.
A somewhat different and more complex regime applies to the
direction to investors for the repatriation of earnings.73 A direct
investor is required to repatriate from Schedule "A" countries either
the excess of earnings over the percentages repatriated during an
averaged base-period (1964-1966) or the amount of the excess of
earnings over the amount that may be reinvested as part of the 110%
capital transfer, whichever is greater; from Schedule "B" countries,
71 Ibid., 1000.319(c).
72 FDIR, Subpart E, § 1000.504.
13 FDIR, Subpart B, § 1000.202.
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either the base-period standard (1964-1966) or the excess over the
65% permissible capital transfer whichever is greater; and from
Schedule "C" countries, either the base-period standard or the excess
over 35% of the investment in the "C" countries during the average
of 1965-1966, whichever is greater.
The repatriation requirement is an innovation that is likely to
prove rather troublesome in operation. Unless the direct investor has
voting control of the foreign project, the amount of repatriation of
earnings necessarily depends upon the corporate decision of the
project directors, and is moreover subject to the foreign exchange
laws and regulations of the country concerned. There are thus two
decisions-one private and the other governmental-that may be
beyond the control of the direct investor, and hence the reach of the
U.S. controls.
Unlike the interest equalization tax, which exempted from its
provisions most pending transactions, the new mandatory controls
in form apply to all transactions, regardless of their stage of per-
formance. The result was predictably a wave of thousands of re-
quests for special licenses and authorizations. Part of the administra-
tive pressure was reduced by the issuance of General Authorization
No. 1 on January 22, 1968, relating to guaranties and payments of
indebtedness under pre-existing loan commitments or lines of credit,
delivery of securities, etc., where transfers were authorized.74
But this is just the beginning of the mandatory controls. The
Secretary of Commerce has issued the form of reports required under
the regulations. The basic form, "Base Period Report," supra, p. 434,
is a rather formidable form and is supplemented by additional forms
directed at the following:
Supplement 1 Identification of Direct Investor
Supplement 2 Identification of Affiliated Foreign Nationals
Supplement 3 Foreign Borrowing by the Direct Investor and
Foreign-Incorporated Finance Subsidiaries
(Parts A and B)
Supplement 4 Borrowings by Affiliated Nationals From Non-
Affiliated Persons Within the United States
Supplement 5 Exploration for, and Development of, Foreign
Gas, Oil and Other Mineral Resources
Supplement 6 Transactions with Affiliated Foreign Nationals
Engaged in Shipping
r' 7 Int. Leg. Materials, 62-63 (January, 1968).




The preparation of these forms will require unimaginable hours
of effort on the part of accountants, economists, treasurers, lawyers.
The results will be photocopied or printed into bulging folders and
reports at staggering costs, financial and psychological. And what will
the staffs of the Secretary of Commerce do with the resulting avalanche
of papers?
All of this has been ordered by the government in defense of the
balance of payments of the United States. The causes of the deficits
in that balance demonstrably lie elsewhere than in business invest-
ment or banking or other financial operations abroad. Per contra,
business investment, banking, and other financial operations have in-
variably reduced our deficits, as Chart II proves. The causes of the
deficit are writ in recent history. The attack on the deficit must needs
come there: the financial operations of our own government abroad.
That remedy has not yet been fully recognized by our government.
And so long as the obvious remedy eludes us, we will continue to be
plagued with deficits in our balances of payments. And if we con-
tinue down the present road of mandatory controls over business
investment, the deficit will only continue to grow, for these controls
reduce future capital inflow " as returns on the controlled capital
outflow necessarily decline. But, then, is not that the historical way
with massive controls over the economy?
75 Assuming no major change in the quality and purposes of new investment
abroad.
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